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DEEPA DAS ACEVEDO*
Temples, Courts, and Dynamic Equilibrium
in the Indian Constitutiont
Must all states have fixed constitutional identities? Does democ-
racy necessarily entail citizen-sovereignty? This Article uses ethno-
graphic data from India to argue that the answer to both questions
is "no." In the aftermath of a massive stampede in 2011, the Kerala
High Court initiated an overhaul of the complex executive, legislative,
and judicial network that governs the famous Hindu temple at Sabari-
mala. The court's conflicting goals were to avoid further consolidating
government authority over the temple and to further empower officials
so that they could undertake needed reforms. Ultimately the court did
both-and neither-in an instance of judicial balancing that reflects
the two visions of sovereignty in India. On the one hand, Indian consti-
tutional law and judicial practice reflect a conventional vision of sov-
ereignty, in which sovereign authority is wholly vested in citizens and
merely exercised on their behalf by the state. On the other hand, there
exists a vision of "divided sovereignty" in which the state, as the agent
of reform, has sovereign authority independent of citizens. The produc-
tive tension between these two visions, according to which sovereignty
is both vested wholly in citizens and divided between citizens and state,
is the dynamic equilibrium at the heart of Indian democracy.
INTRODUCTION
A court order determines that women can be banned from a
Hindu temple because their presence offends the presiding deity,
who is celibate.' A statute brings nearly two thousand Hindu temples
under government control and directs their incomes into a general
* A.B., Princeton (2006); Ph.D., University of Chicago (2013); J.D., University of
Chicago (2016). My thanks to Tom Ginsburg, John Comaroff, and William Mazzarella
for reading earlier versions or portions of this paper; to Shyam Balganesh and Daniel
Lee for pointing me toward literature on dynamic equilibrium and sovereignty out-
sourcing; and, as always, to John F. Acevedo and Mallika Das. Research for this paper
was funded in part by a grant from the Social Science Research Council.
t http://dx.doi/org/10.1093/ajcl/avw002
1. See, e.g., S. Mahendran v. The Secretary, Travancore Devaswom Board, OP No.
9015/1990-S, discussed in Deepa Das Acevedo, Celibate Gods and "Essential Practices"
Jurisprudence at Sabarinala, 1991-2011, in FILING RELIGION: STATE, HINDUISM, AND
COURTS OF LAw 101 (Daniela Berti et al eds., 2016).
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temple pool for redistribution.2 Two federal judges launch an inquiry
into whether a "cosmic light" (witnessed annually by a constituency
several times the population of Camden, New Jersey)3 is a signal of
divine satisfaction or simply man-made fireworks.4
It goes without saying that the Indian government-and in the
above examples, the State of Kerala-has significant power over the
religious lives of its Hindu citizens.5 India's Constitution is relatively
up-front about this. At a general level, the Constitution enables the
state to regulate or restrict "any economic, financial, political, or other
secular activity which may be associated with religious practice."6 As
regards Hinduism, the Constitution also empowers the state to throw
open "Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes
and sections of Hindus"7 and prohibits the practice of untouchability.,
And the special characteristics of this relationship between Hinduism
and the Indian state have been ably explored by generations of schol-
ars and judges.9
But India's Constitution also guarantees traditional liberal pro-
tections like "freedom of conscience and [the] free profession, practice
and propagation of religion."10 There's a kind of cognitive dissonance
involved in saying that a constitution protects freedom of reli-
gion, with all the baggage about non-involvement hat this position
entails, and in simultaneously saying that the same constitution is a
2. TRAVANCORE COCHIN HINDU RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS ACT & RULES, 1951 (R.P. Reme-
san ed., 2006).
3. State & County QuickFacts: Camden, New Jersey, UNITED STATES CENSUS
BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/34/3410000.html (last visited June 30,
2015) (stating that, according to the 2010 census, Camden's population was 77,346).
4. See infra Part I.A.
5. There can be no question that the state exerts more authority over Hinduism.
See, e.g., Deepa Das Acevedo, Secularism in the Indian Context, 38 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY
138, 146 (2013) (noting that the Central Wakf Council advises the Indian government
respecting Muslim charitable donations, but that overall the state "does not relate to
Muslims and Christians in any way that could be considered parallel or analogous to
the depth of government involvement with Hindu temples, mutts (i.e., monasteries),
and charitable institutions"); VRINDA NARAIN, RECLAIMING THE NATION: MUSLIM WOMEN
AND THE LAW IN INDIA 86 (2008) (arguing that "the state has studiously avoided address-
ing both the issue of gender inequality in Muslim personal law, as well as the enact-
ment of a UCC [Uniform Civil Code]").
6. INDIA CONST. art. 25(2)(a).
7. Id. art. 25(2)(b).
8. Id. art. 17. It's worth noting, too, that "Hinduism" in Article 25(2)(b) is defined
as including Buddhism, Sikhism, and Jainism, so that the state has equal authority
over the institutions and practices of those faiths, although it doesn't fully exercise
that authority. Id. art. 25 (Explanation II).
9. For a thoroughly unrepresentative sample of this enormous literature, see
Gurpreet Mahajan, Religion and the Indian Constitution: Questions of Separation
and Equality, in POLITICS AND ETHICS OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION 297 (Rajeev Bhargava
ed., 2008); C.J. Fuller, Hinduism and Scriptural Authority in Modern Indian Law, 30
COMP. STUD. Soc'Y & HiST. 225 (1988); Rajeev Dhavan, Religious Freedom in India, 35
AM. J. COMP. L. 209 (1987); J. DUNCAN M. DERRETT, RELIGION, LAW AND THE STATE IN INDIA
(1968); Marc Galanter, Secularism East and West, 7 COMP. STUD. Soc'Y & HIST. 133
(1965).
10. INDIA CONST. art. 25.
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"confrontational document" because of "its commitment to reshap[ing]
key structures of the social order."" So how can we reduce the
dissonance?
One approach has been to say that it's acceptable for the Indian
Constitution to grant the state singular authority over Hinduism, but
less appropriate for the state to exercise such authority over other
religions. This is because Hindus dominate India's population and
parliament, and so Hindus (who lack an ecclesiastical structure com-
parable to many Christian communities) are essentially using politi-
cal institutions to govern and limit themselves. 12 John Hart Ely would
probably approve,1 3 but representation-reinforcement arguments rise
and fall on the vision of pluralist representation they're based on.14
And just what "pluralist representation" ideally or actually means in
the Indian context is, to be only mildly facetious, anyone's guess.1 5
Others have sought to overcome the dissonance by changing one of
the conflicting "cognitions." For the most part, this has meant equating
"religious freedom" with "secularism," and then interpreting "secular-
ism" to mean something other than the kind of separation and non-
establishment associated with American constitutional jurisprudence.
For example, instead of requiring "strict separation," so-called "Indian
secularism" is said to only require "principled distance" or "celebratory
neutrality" and "reformatory justice."16 The two-step analysis involved
in this approach allows some commentators to argue that there's no
cognitive dissonance involved in the state's simultaneous efforts to
11. GARY JEFFREY JACOBSOHN, CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY 216 (2010).
12. Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Reason, Tradition, Authority: Religion and the Indian
State, in MEN'S LAWS, WOMEN'S LIVES: A CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON RELIGION, COMMON
LAW AND CULTURE IN SOUTH ASIA 56 (Indira Jaising ed., 2005).
13. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
14. Shane Pennington, Completing Ely's Representation Reinforcing Theory of
Judicial Review by Accounting for the Constitutional Values of State Citizenship, 15
TEX. REV. L. & POL. 219, 220 (2010) (arguing that Ely's theory depends largely "on
the rigor of his conception of American representative democracy,"' which is "critically
incomplete" because he "overlooks the role federalism plays in our representational
scheme").
15. Compare Sudipta Kaviraj, Modernity and Politics in India, 129 DAEDALUS,
no. 1, 2000, at 137, 154 ("Indian nationalism ... retained its confidence in the idea
that . .. there was no way of being an Indian without first being a Tamil or Maratha
or Bengali. Indian nationalism was therefore a second-order identity...."), with Gyan
Prakash, The Modern Nation's Return in the Archaic, 23 CRITICAL INQUIRY 536, 539
(1997) (arguing that at the turn of the twentieth century, Hindu elites "invoked the
image of a universal and singular archaic religion, validated by science, to forge dif-
ference into unity, multiplicity into singularity[;] .. . the idea of ancient Hindu science
functioned as a project to constitute a modern national subject-homogenous, whole,
and pure").
16. Rajeev Bhargava, India's Secular Constitution, in INDIA'S LIVING CONSTITUTION:
IDEAS, PRACTICES, CONTROVERSIES 105 (Zoya Hasan et al. eds., 2005); Rajeev Dhavan, The
Road to Xanadu: India's Quest for Secularism, in RELIGION AND PERSONAL LAW IN SECU-
LAR INDIA 301, 311 (Gerald Larson ed., 2001) (arguing that "Indian secularism" consists
of religious freedom, celebratory neutrality, and reformatory justice). See also Seval
Yildirim, Expanding Secularism's Scope: An Indian Case Study, 52 AM. J. COMP. L.
901 (2004) (describing "Indian secularism" as "a discourse to reconstruct the political
space so that religion and the state can co-exist").
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protect freedom of conscience and to reform religious practice.1 7 But
there's arguably no reason to take that first step."
Instead of trying to square the circle, we'd be better served in our
efforts to understand Indian jurisprudence on religious freedom by
adopting a view that doesn't seek either to minimize the conflict or to
justify it using other assertions about Indian democracy that are them-
selves highly problematic. Put differently, we need to account for the
strong versions of both claims-that the Indian state protects religious
freedom and that it actively seeks to regulate and reform religion. We
can do this if we let go of the idea that the purpose of constitutional
law is to construct and maintain one particular theory of the state. Or,
as the Indian example shows, constitutions and the practices they give
rise to can seek to support a perpetual and dynamic equilibrium.19
This Article makes three contributions to legal scholarship. First,
it speaks to scholars of Indian law by proposing that the Indian
Constitution is neither "militant" nor "acquiescent" vis-a-vis society.20
Rather, the Indian Constitution encourages a dynamic equilibrium
between these two visions of state-society relations. To be clear, I am
not arguing for any particular interpretation of constitutional prose
(for example, I'm not interested in whether "freedom of conscience"
means X, much less in whether X has or hasn't been successfully imple-
mented). Nor am I using "dynamic equilibrium" in the sense of inter-
branch contributions to statutory interpretation that's most closely
connected to the American Legal Process School of jurisprudence.2 1
17. See Bhargava, supra note 16; Dhavan, supra note 16; Yildirim, supra note 16.
18. See Das Acevedo, supra note 5, at 163 (arguing "that the nonsecular actions of
the Indian state are reasonable, though not for the reasons most commonly cited" and
that we need "to acknowledge that a liberal-democratic state may still have reason-
able nonsecular aims").
19. Michel Rosenfeld has also argued for a "dynamic" understanding of constitu-
tional identity, where the dynamism is between two facets of self-identity: sameness
and selfhood. Like Rosenfeld, I think that constitutional identity is something best
thought of at the "systemic" level, and in terms of the "essential links between the
constitution, its environment, and those who launched it as well as those for whom it
was intended." Michel Rosenfeld, Constitutional Identity, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 756, 759-60 (Michel Rosenfeld & Andras Saj6 eds.,
2012). However, in this Article, I question the degree to which we can confidently iden-
tify a constitutional identity (or theory of the state) and show that, at least in the
Indian case, there isn't just one. And although there are some similarities between my
argument here and what's referred to as the "incrementalist" or "defer[red] decision-
making" approach to constitutional drafting, I'm interested in what has been decided
rather than what hasn't. See HANA LERNER, MAKING CONSTITUTIONS IN DEEPLY DIVIDED
SOCIETIES 39 (2011) (generally discussing the "incrementalist approach"); Tom Gins-
burg & Rosalind Dixon, Deciding Not to Decide: Deferral in Constitutional Design, 9
INT'L J. CONST. DESIGN 636 (2011) (generally discussing deferred decision making in
constitutional drafting).
20. Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn, The Sounds of Silence: Militant and Acquiescent Con-
stitutionalism, in THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 131 (Steven
Kautz et al eds., 2009).
21. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equi-
librium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 28 (1994) (describing law as "an equilibrium, a state of
balance among competing forces or institutions").
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But I am claiming that, whatever their specific meaning, important
aspects of the Indian Constitution proceed from fundamentally dis-
tinct first principles, and that the tension between those principles is
meant to be perpetuated rather than resolved.
Second, and following naturally from this first claim, the Article
speaks to scholars of constitutional identity and design by show-
ing that democratic government fundamentally does not have fixed,
nation-specific meanings or purposes.22 Of course, these scholars are
likely to object that thumbnail sketches along the lines of "democ-
racy in India was meant to reform society" are true in their essentials
or that they aren't meant to be taken at face value-that when we
make such statements, we're simply engaging in a kind of intellec-
tual shorthand.2 3 This may well be, but the shorthand is often taken
quite seriously-as, for example, in debates about broadened stand-
ing to sue and the distinct concerns it may trigger in India versus the
United States.24 The full ramifications of such shorthand are beyond
the scope of this Article, but the point that we can empirically dis-
prove such simplistic characterizations is central to its argument.25
22. In a sense, this means I agree with both Laurence Tribe and Gary Jacobsohn
on the issue of articulating constitutional identities. Like Jacobsohn, I think it's fair to
speak of "identifiable continuities of meaning" within a constitution. JACOBSOHN, supra
note 11, at 4. But unlike Jacobsohn, I'm only interested in tensions between "continui-
ties of meaning" that are internal to the written Indian Constitution, and I don't view
this tension as "disharmony" or as a set of "contradictions and imbalances." Id. at 87.
Moreover, unlike Jacobsohn (but like Tribe), I am not sure it makes sense to speak of
a constitutional identity-whether static or dynamic-because "deeply irreconcilable
ideals and premises are at work in the very same text." Laurence H. Tribe, The Idea of
the Constitution:A Metaphor-morphosis, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 170, 172 (1987).
23. See, e.g., JACOBSOHN, supra note 11, at 18 (describing the Indian Constitution
as "in its essentials, predominantly about the urgency of change").
24. Despite marked political and jurisprudential differences, American scholars
of standing generally agree that the worry at the heart of standing debates is, and
ought to be, maintaining the separation of powers. See Heather Elliott, Standing Les-
sons: What We Can Learn When Conservative Plaintiffs Lose Under Article III Stand-
ing Doctrine, 87 IND. L.J. 551 (2012); Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan?
Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article 111, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 189 (1992); Antonin
Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers,
17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983). Conversely, Indian conversations on public interest
litigation (which eliminated standing requirements in select cases) focused on docket
flood in the 1970s and recently switched to expanded standing's inability to further
progressive goals, but they have only minimally emphasized the separation of powers.
See, e.g., Deepa Das Acevedo, Sovereignty Considerations and Social Change in the
Wake of India's Recent Sodomy Cases, 40 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017)
(discussing shifts in the policy goals of public interest litigation suits as a reflection
of dynamic equilibrium); A.S. Anand, Judicial Review-Judicial Activism-Need for
Caution, 42 J. INDIAN LEGAL INST. 149, 155 (2000) (describing public interest litigation
as a "potent weapon" by means of which "the underprivileged and the downtrodden
have secured access to court through the agency of a public-spirited person or organ-
isation"); Upendra Baxi, Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation in the
Supreme Court of India, 4 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 107 (1985).
25. As Elkins et al. argue, "design choices matter"-perhaps in ways we hadn't
thought. The "dynamic equilibrium" discussed in this Article can be understood as a
variation on the theme of constitutional flexibility. But "dynamic equilibrium" signals
flexibility at the level of underlying impulses rather than of specific rules or articles.
ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG & JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITU-
TIONS 81-88 (2009).
559
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW
Third, and following from the second claim, this Article has a few
things to say about how anthropology might contribute to empirical
legal scholarship. Anthropology has often had a tenuous relationship
with law, either because anthropologists have sometimes been pre-
occupied with whether it makes sense to talk of "the law" at all or
because different disciplinary priorities preclude them from making
the kind of generalizable normative pronouncements that law folk
value (and which economists, among others, are especially happy
to provide).2 6 This Article is hardly a call for a convergence-either
of anthropologists to law or of legal scholars to anthropology-that
would most likely leave all parties worse off. But it does demonstrate
that both sides may be overstating their mutual unintelligibility.
The daily governance of religious institutions is an important
part of state control over Hinduism, and this governance occurs at
the state and local levels. Consequently, Part I dives deep into the
weeds of religion-state relations in a particular Indian state, Kerala.
I use ethnographic data to describe the Kerala High Court's approach
to religion-state relations in two instances: during the "cosmic light"
investigation mentioned earlier and in the face of appeals to restruc-
ture the same landmark temple's administration. Part II draws on
case law from around India as well as on Indian legal and constitu-
tional history to show that the High Court's approach was not idio-
syncratic. It also argues that "dynamic equilibrium" as a theory of
constitutional law and judicial behavior is relevant outside the realm
of religion-state relations, and perhaps outside India itself.27
I. TEMPLE ADMINISTRATION IN "GOD'S OWN COUNTRY" 28
Kerala, the small state at the southwestern tip of India, stands
apart on a number of metrics. It has one of the highest literacy rates
26. From the anthropologists' side, one of the most famous critiques of anthropol-
ogy-law collaborations is Simon Roberts, Do We Need an Anthropology of Law?, 25
ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INST. NEWS, Apr. 1978, at 4, 4 (calling certain anthropological
engagements with law "some of the most wasteful and debilitating quarrels within
the discipline" and saying that "there should never have been an anthropology of 'law'
at all"). A different critique of legal anthropology emerged through the grand 1960s
debate between Max Gluckman and Paul Bohannon over whether or not Western legal
concepts could be used to understand non-Western legal systems. See MAX GLUCKMAN,
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS AMONG THE BAROTSE OF NORTHERN RHODESIA (1955); PAUL BOHAN-
NAN, JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT AMONG THE TIv (1957). Much more recently, Annelise Riles
has defended an "anthropology of law" to legal scholars by saying that the interdisci-
plinary approach offers "an interplay between normativity and reflexivity as modes
of knowledge" that constitutes a "significant contribution to legal scholarship today."
Annelise Riles, Representing In-Between: Law, Anthropology, and the Rhetoric of Inter-
disciplinarity, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 597, 632 (1994).
27. Much of the information that follows was gathered during fieldwork between
June 2009 and September 2011, but I have indicated specific sources including inter-
views, observation dates, and court filings wherever applicable.
28. The phrase "God's Own Country" was coined by the civil servant Amitabh
Kant for a late-1990s Kerala tourism campaign. AMITABH KANT, BRANDING INDIA: AN
INCREDIBLE STORY 59 (2009).
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in India2 9 as well as the world, 0 a population the size of Canada's
with a GDP per person the size of Papua New Guinea's,3 1 and a reli-
gious composition that's approximately 56% Hindu, 25% Muslim, and
19% Christian.32 Since 1959, when the Communist Party of India
(Marxist) or CPI(M) first won control of the state legislature, Kerala
has basically alternated between the CPI(M) and the Indian National
Congress.3 3 Overall, the state's approach to socioeconomic develop-
ment has made enough advances in education, land reform, and gen-
der equality to become known as the "Kerala Model."3 4
But as far as the governance of Hindu institutions is concerned,
Kerala is firmly on the same cricket pitch as other South Indian
states.35 Keralite temples have extensive administrative needs that
have traditionally been met by a mix of local elites and distant rulers.
During the colonial era, British officials gradually increased their
control over temple administration in the Madras Presidency, which
29. Compare Census of India 2011-Provisional Population Totals-Rural and
Urban Distribution (India, Kerala, Districts), CENSUS OF INDIA 2011, http://censusindia.
gov.in/2011-prov-results/paper2/data files/kerala/Pamphlet kerala.pdf (last visited
Mar. 29, 2015) (listing Kerala as having the highest literacy rate in the country at
about 94%, with the second highest being Mizoram at 91.30%), with Tripura Beats
Kerala in Literacy, TIMES OF INDIA (Sept. 8, 2013), http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/
home/education/news/Tripura-beats-Kerala-in-literacy/articleshow/22416019.cms
(describing Tripura as having the highest literacy rate, 94.65%, just ahead of Kerala
at 93.93%).
30. For instance, UNESCO's estimate of the global adult literacy rate in 2012 was
80% for women and 89% for men. International Literacy Data 2014, UNESCO INST.
FOR STATISTICS, http://www.uis.unesco.org/literacy/Pages/1iteracy-data-release-2014.
aspx (last visited May 10, 2015).
31. Comparing Indian States and Territories with Countries:An Indian Summary,
ECONOMIST (last visited Mar. 29, 2015), http://www.economist.com/content/indian-sum-
mary
32. Biju Govind, Increase in Muslim Population in the State, THE HINDU (Sept. 23,
2004), http://www.thehindu.com/2004/09/23/stories/2004092306010500.htm (attribut-
ing these figures to the 2001 census). See also Joanna Sugden & Shanoor Seervai,
Where Are India's 2011 Census Figures on Religion?, WALL ST. J.: INDIA REAL TIME (Jan.
9, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2015/01/09/where-are-indias-census-fig-
ures-on-religion/ (noting that, as of January 2015, no religion figures from the 2011
census had been released).
33. The Kerala government's website lists previous chief ministers and the com-
position of legislatures dating back to 1947. Chief Ministers Since 1957, GOVERNMENT
OF KERALA, https://kerala.gov.in/chief-ministers-since- 1957 (last visited July 7, 2016).
34. See, e.g., JEAN DREZE & AMARTYA SEN, INDIA: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL
OPPORTUNITY (1995); Govindan Parayil, The 'Kerala Model' of Development: Develop-
ment and Sustainability in the Third World, 17 THIRD WORLD Q. 941 (1996).
35. Keralite temples, like temples in other South Indian states, are larger, richer,
and more powerful than their North Indian counterparts. As a result, they've been
closely intertwined with kingship and executive authority on both literal and figu-
rative levels. On the one hand, the wealth of South Indian temples as well as their
status as centers of economic redistribution has meant hat they've been incredibly
important to South Indian rulers-precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial alike. AEJuN
APPADURAI, WORSHIP AND CONFLICT UNDER COLONIAL RULE: A SOUTH INDIAN CASE (1981).
On the other hand, temple deities are kings in their own right, who personally own
the property and movable wealth of their temples. Deepa Das Acevedo, Divine Sov-
ereignty, Indian Property Law and the Dispute Over the Padmanabhaswamy Temple,
50 MOD. ASIAN STUD. 841 (2016); Anthony Good, Law, Legitimacy, and the Hereditary
Rights of Tamil Temple Priests, 23 MOD. ASIAN STUD. 233 (1989).
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comprised Malabar (northern Kerala) and all of present-day Tamil
Nadu, as well as parts of modern Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka.
After initially replacing the rulers who had functioned as patrons
and arbitrators of temple disputes, colonial officials eventually
reorganized the structure of temple governance itself via Act I of
1925, which created a Hindu Religious Endowments (HRE) board to
administer public Hindu temples throughout the Presidency.36 Not
only did the HRE system apply directly to Malabar, it also inspired
the administrative structure for temple governance in central and
southern Kerala (combined into the Indian state of Travancore-
Cochin in 1949) as well as the modern state of Kerala (created in
1956).37
Today, public temples in Kerala are governed by three distinct
yet overlapping systems. In the first system, five geographically
defined statutory boards oversee the daily operations of over 1,700
temples ranging in size from roadside altars to regional pilgrimage
centers like the one studied in this Article.38 The boards are rich-
richer than any other statutory body in the state-and influential
because of their control over valuable state contracts and temple
jobs. The most powerful of these boards (and the one discussed
later on in this section) is the Travancore Devaswom Board (TDB),
which controls over 1,000 temples and is named for the former
princely state with whose southern Keralite territory it roughly
36. Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, Act I of 1925 (Madras Presidency).
See, e.g., Robert Eric Frykenberg, The Construction of Hinduism as a "Public" Reli-
gion: Looking Again at the Religious Roots of Company Raj in South India, in RELIGION
AND PUBLIC CULTURE: ENCOUNTERS AND IDENTITIES IN MODERN SOUTH INDIA 3 (Keith E. Yan-
dell & John J. Paul eds., 2000); EDGAR THURSTON, THE MADRAS PRESIDENCY, WITH MYSORE,
COORG AND THE ASSOCIATED STATES (Cambridge Univ. Press 2011) (1913) (describing the
geography of the erstwhile presidency).
37. The relationship between the British and the princely state of Travancore is
especially interesting in the context of temple governance. As Travancore's indebted-
ness to Britain grew during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, so too
did Britain's authority over the kingdom. This finally culminated in the 1810 installa-
tion of Colonel John Munro as both British Agent and Dewan (Prime Minister). Dur-
ing the reigns of two queens-regent, Munro promoted greater and more centralized
state authority over Hindu temples as an antidote to the corruption of local trustees
(with impressive revenue-generation as a fringe benefit). See Deepa Das Acevedo,
Religion, Law, and the Making of a Liberal Indian State ch. 1 (2013) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago) (on file with author); T.K. VELU PILLAI, 3 THE
TRAVANCORE STATE MANUAL (1940).
38. The five boards are Travancore, Cochin, Malabar (established in 2008), Guru-
vayur, and Koodalmanickam. The Cochin and Malabar Devaswom Boards (CDB and
MDB, respectively) are considerably smaller and poorer than that of Travancore. In
keeping with their limited resources as well as the more flexible traditions of temple
governance in those regions, the CDB and MDB have far less control over the temples
within their jurisdictions. The CDB controls around 420 temples, while the number
of temples under the MDB is unclear. Unlike the first three, Guruvayur and Koodal-
manickam are responsible only for a single major temple each along with some sub-
sidiary shrines, and are not subject to High Court financial oversight. Interview with
Unnikrishnan, attorney for the Cochin Devaswom Board, in Cochin, Kerala (Feb. 11,
2011).
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coincides.3 9 Members of the TDB are chosen by Hindu members of
the state legislature and state cabinet.4 0
Second, the state government includes a cabinet-level temple port-
folio. This person, the Minister for Devaswom Affairs, isn't nearly as
powerful within Travancore as the TDB, but he does oversee a state-
wide Devaswom department and his influence is moderately stronger
in regions governed by the other temple boards.4 1 Within Travancore,
the Minister supervises some subsidiary offices jointly with the TDB,
although the power-sharing dynamics of these collaborations are con-
stantly shifting. For example, a "Devaswom commissioner" was until
recently appointed by the TDB with the High Court's approval, but a
few years ago the TDB circumvented the court and appointed the com-
missioner in conjunction with the state government.
Third, the temple boards are accountable to the Kerala High
Court. The chief justice of the High Court appoints two judges-usu-
ally one junior and one senior-to the "temple bench," which sits
twice weekly to hear matters for all public temples in the state. In the
1980s, the High Court acquired audit powers over the TDB, thanks to
a forceful judge (and future Supreme Court justice), K.S. Paripoornan,
who firmly believed that the court needed to "pull up these fellows"
(i.e., the board officials) by making the TDB's internal functions stan-
dardized, transparent, and accountable to another branch of govern-
ment.4 2 As a result of Justice Paripoornan's reforms, the High Court
today considers matters that range from the exceedingly minute
(approving a replacement chauffeur for the TDB's president) to the
administrative (determining whether local police can lease office
space within temple grounds) to the quasi-religious (assessing the
relative monetary share, from devotee offerings, of a junior priest who
also performs the duties of a senior priest) to, as we'll see, the validity
of religious beliefs.43
39. The exact number of temples within the TDB's jurisdiction is unclear. Com-
pare Interview with G. Sudhakaran, former Minister for Devaswom Affairs (July 18,
2011) (giving a figure of 1,400 temples), with M.G. Radhakrishnan, Temple Muddle,
INDIA TODAY (Apr. 9, 2010), http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/Temple+muddle/1/92107.
html (referring to 1,210 temples), and TRAVANCORE DEVASWOM BOARD (Mar. 29, 2015),
http://travancoredevaswomboard.org (referring to 1,248 temples).
40. Given this fact, as well as the degree to which temple boards are constrained
by judicial and executive officials, I consider the TDB to be a part of the state even
though many of my interlocutors pushed back against this characterization. But even
their own terminology-according to which the TDB is "an instrumentality" of the
state or a "constitutional authority"-emphasizes the board's deep embeddedness in
state government.
41. The current Minister for Devaswom Affairs is Kadakampally Surendran.
Council of Ministers, NIYAMASABHA, http://www.niyamasabha.org/codes/cmin.htm (last
visited July 7, 2016).
42. Interview with K.S. Paripoornan, Retired Justice, Supreme Court of India, in
Cochin, Kerala (Mar. 11, 2011).
43. Cases on all of these subjects were heard by the Kerala High Court on March
9, 2011. If a public temple wants to spend less than Rs 100,000 (approximately $1480),
it can request approval directly from the ombudsman, but requests beyond that level
require an appearance b fore the temple bench.
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Since 2007, the High Court's authority over temples has been
bolstered by the creation of a "Devaswom ombudsman" position that
is jointly controlled by the chief justice and the temple bench. The
ombudsman is responsible for hearing limited funding requests as
well as for reviewing the TDB's annual reports and making recom-
mendations to the temple bench based on those reports. Additionally,
he can conduct preliminary hearings for grievances against the
boards at the plaintiff's request.44 Finally, the High Court and a
local district judge select a special commissioner whose sole task is
to report to the court regarding the management of Sabarimala, the
richest temple within the TDB's domain and the scene of the events
described below.
A. The "Star" and the "Lamp"
Sabarimala, in the words of a former special commissioner, may
be "the biggest commercial enterprise in Kerala."4 5 Along with the
Guruvayur temple in central Kerala and the Padmanabhaswamy
temple in the state capital, Sabarimala is one of the richest reli-
gious institutions in India.4 6 But what makes Sabarimala unusual-
besides its exclusion of physically mature women-is that it is a
vibrant regional pilgrimage center. During the pilgrimage "season"
(mid-November to mid-January), thousands of men and boys fly,
drive, or train into Kerala and proceed on foot to the temple, walking
at least five kilometers and as much as 200 kilometers. Before they
embark on this journey, pilgrims must undergo a forty-one-day pen-
ance during which they abstain from meat, alcohol, and sex and wear
distinctive black clothing.
The climax of Sabarimala's season is the festival of Makarasan-
kranti, or the day when the sun transitions from Sagittarius to
Capricorn. It almost always falls on January 14, and is widely cele-
brated in India.4 7 At Sabarimala, Makarasankranti s the last day of
public festivities during the season; after January 14, there are a few
events involving the Pandalam family (the temple's former royal guard-
ians) but the public is not permitted to visit again until the temple is
reopened on January 20.48
As well as marking the finale of the pilgrimage season,
Makarasankranti s also considered the most auspicious time to wor-
ship Sabarimala's presiding deity, Ayyappan.4 9 Around 6:30 p.m. on
January 14, a bright light in the sky becomes visible from the temple
44. Kerala High Court Order No. Omb/Estt/2008.
45. Interview with Ramkumar, Special Commissioner for Sabarimala, in Ernaku-
lam, Kerala (Feb. 1, 2011).
46. Das Acevedo, supra note 35, at 856 n.39.
47. Interview with Kandararu Maheswararu, Chief Priest of Sabarimala, in
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grounds (for the sake of clarity, let's call this the "star").5 0 The star
remains visible while Sabarimala's chief priest opens the doors of the
inner sanctum to display the deity's image fully attired in ceremonial
gold ornaments, and stays visible while the chief priest conducts a
deeparadhana, or ritual circling of flame before the deity. By the time
he finishes, the star has disappeared. At this point, another light (the
"lamp")5 1 appears in an empty field around eight kilometers away
that is believed to be the original site of the temple. The lamp flashes
three times while an eagle circles three times overhead, and then the
lamp also disappears.5 2
Together, these phenomena and the fact that the day signals the
end of the season mean that tens of thousands of devotees-espe-
cially out-of-state pilgrims-aim to be inside the temple complex on
Makarasankranti.5 3 In fact, many arrive a few days early and camp
on the fields and steep hills urrounding the temple in order to ensure
a good viewing spot.5 4 Unsurprisingly, there's often a huge rush to
leave as soon as the Makarasankranti ceremonies conclude, and it
was exactly this rush that caused the stampede of January 14, 2011
and the deaths of 102 pilgrims.5 5
On January 20, 2011, during a regularly scheduled session of the
temple bench, an irate High Court rebuked the TDB and the state
government for the stampede.5 6 After some initial questions about
which spots had incurred the most casualties, the senior judge on
the temple bench, Thottathil B. Radhakrishnan, turned to the star
and the lamp.5 7 He opened by asking if the TDB could define the
50. Makarajyothi (makaram meaning "Capricorn" and jyothi meaning "light" in
Malayalam) (translated by author).
51. Makaravilakku (vilakku meaning "lamp" in Malayalam) (translated by
author).
52. Readers should bear in mind that although I distinguish between the phe-
nomena referred to as the "star" and the "lamp" and assign a particular term to each
phenomenon, there was no such conceptual clarity or terminological consistency in
the real time discussions of these events.
53. Interview with Rahul Easwar, grandson of Sabarimala's Chief Priest, in
Trivandrum, Kerala (June 28, 2011).
54. Id.
55. Sabarimala Stampede: 102 Pilgrims Killed, 50 Injured, NDTV (Jan. 15, 2011),
http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/sabarimala-stampede- 102-pilgrims-killed-50-in-
jured-445065.
56. Kerala High Court, Cochin, Kerala (Jan. 20, 2011). Readers should note hat
there was no official transcript of the courtroom proceedings, and that all quotations
from the proceedings that appear in this Article are drawn from notes I took while
attending sessions of the temple bench.
57. It's possible that Judge Radhakrishnan was just following orders. The day
before, at a social gathering where Judge Radhakrishnan was present, the chief jus-
tice of the High Court voiced his opinion that the root cause of the stampede might
rest in how the star and the lamp were perceived by devotees. Likewise, the then-jun-
ior judge on the temple bench, "who had 'made his feelings [against pursuing this line
of inquiry] clear' at the January 19 meeting," was rotated to another bench within two
weeks-although note that judges are regularly rotated between benches, and there
is no requirement that both members of the "temple bench" be rotated out together.
Interview with K. Balakrishnan, Professor, Nat'l Univ. of Advanced Legal Studies, in
Cochin, Kerala (Feb. 21, 2011).
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significance of the star and the lamp, and then-unsatisfied with
the answer-asked whether they were "man-made." Since the room
stayed silent (a rarity in Indian courts, even at the federal level),
Judge Radhakrishnan moved to justify his questions:
See, blind faith is good but when faith and law conflict there
is provision in the Constitution to abridge [faith] for public
health and morality. . . . If you go by the Directive Principles
and Fundamental Duties section, a scientific temperament
should be grown up in the people .... If the makarajyothi s
man-made, the people should be told.58
This, essentially, was the court's position for the next five weeks.
Over that period, the temple bench repeatedly questioned the TDB's
attorneys about the difference between the star and the lamp, wheth-
er either was man-made, and if so by whom. Toward the end of the
inquiry (i.e., late April), Judge Radhakrishnan's interest in having
these questions answered seemed to stem from his sense that the
TDB and other government authorities were profiting from the in-
tense and naive faith of believers-but at the outset, the court's mo-
tive, much less its intended conclusion, was decidedly unclear.59 Even
more confusingly, all of the court's questions had been previously and
publicly addressed, or were answered within a week of the January
20 session.
To begin with, the chief priest and the state government had
already admitted-in public, and at least three years earlier-that
the lamp was lit by human beings.6 0 And the ontological nature of
the star and the lamp had surfaced several times in public interest
suits filed by "rationalist" associations seeking to expose the TDB's
58. Kerala High Court, Cochin, Kerala (Jan. 20, 2011). Actually, there's no men-
tion of this in the Directive Principles (which focus on the state's obligations), but
Judge Radhakrishnan was right that "scientific temperament" does surface in the
Fundamental Duties section (which is citizen-focused): "It shall be the duty of every
citizen of India ... to develop the scientific temper, humanism and the spirit of inquiry
and reform." INDIA CONST. art. 51A(h).
59. On the final day of hearings, Judge Radhakrishnan exclaimed, "See, Sabari-
mala, what is the presiding deity? What is the presiding deity? Lord Ayyappa. For
them"-gesturing to the government's attorney-"it is Kamadhenu!" Kerala High
Court, Cochin, Kerala (Apr. 26, 2011). (Kamadhenu is a divine cow with the power
of giving her master whatever material goods he wants; narratives often feature
Kamadhenu being abducted by unscrupulous figures executing get-rich-quick
schemes.) Despite this cynicism, the court has never really bought into the argument
that promoting the lamp as a "miracle" and "spreading superstition" amounts to a vio-
lation of the "right to life" guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution. See, e.g., Sanal
Edamaruku v. State of Kerala & Others, (2011) WP(C) [unnumbered].
60. K.A. Shaji, Human, All Too Human, 5 TEHELKA MAG., no. 24 (June 21, 2008),
http://archive.tehelka.com/story-main39.asp?filename=Ne2l0608allhumantoohu
man.asp (noting that a member of the government had "urged the ... government to
'disclose all truths' related to [the lamp] and dissociate itself from promoting religious
falsehoods"-and that "to the astonishment of all, the Sabarimala clergy have practi-
cally endorsed his views").
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manufacturing of the phenomena.61 Then, late on the very first
day of the 2011 stampede hearings, the TDB responded to Judge
Radhakrishnan by saying that the star was a "celestial star consid-
ered divine."62
After this unsatisfying and very lawyerly admission, several other
public statements made in rapid succession seemingly put the issue
of human involvement to rest. On January 22, the TDB's president-
along with a Hindu nationalist leader and representatives of both
Sabarimala's hereditary chief priests and the temple's former royal
guardians-acknowledged to The Hindu that the lamp was indeed lit
by human beings, but they denied that the TDB had any role in the
lighting.63 On January 23, a former Devaswom commissioner wrote
an op-ed not only affirming that the TDB was responsible for lighting
the lamp but also stating that this was specifically done to encourage
high attendance during Makarasankranti.6 4 And on January 24-just
ten days after the stampede and on the fourth day of the High Court
inquiry-Sabarimala's chief priest held a news conference at which
he denied having any knowledge of who was actually responsible for
lighting the lamp (but acknowledged it was lit by human hands).65
By early March, when the temple bench shifted to various admin-
istrative issues facing Sabarimala, two things had happened. First,
no current TDB official had admitted either in public or to the court
that the TDB lit the lamp that, in part, drew hundreds of thousands
of valuable pilgrims to Kerala every year. Second, every other kind of
actor conceivably connected to Sabarimala-priests, ex-government
officials, ex-TDB officials, investigative journalists, civic associations,
erstwhile royal guardians-had admitted that the TDB was respon-
sible for lighting the lamp. And what did the Kerala High Court do at
the end of all this? On the final day of the hearings, after nearly six
hours of dialogue during a special session held while the rest of the
61. Over the years, three "rationalist" associations have filed public interest suits
related to the star and the lamp: the Bharat Yukthivadi Sangham, Kerala Yukthi-
vadi Sangham, and Indian Rationalist Association. (Bharat means "India," yukthivadi
means "rationalist," and sangham means "association" in Malayalam) (translated by
author). "Rationalism" as a form of self-consciously modernist activism has a strong
history in South India and in Kerala specifically. The Indian Rationalist Association
was one of the earliest rationalist associations; its first convention took place in 1949
in Madras under the auspices of the prominent rationalist and future chief minister
of Tamil Nadu, C.N. Annadurai. Moreover, one of the first activists to self-identify as a
"rationalist" was the Keralite lawyer Mookencheril Cherian Joseph (1887-1981), who
was popularly known as "Yukthivadi M.C. Joseph." JOHANNES QUACK, DISENCHANTING
INDIA: ORGANIZED RATIONALISM AND CRITICISM OF RELIGION IN INDIA 94 (2011).
62. Kerala High Court, Cochin, Kerala (Jan. 20, 2011).
63. Radhakrishnan Kuttoor, Makarajyothi is Man-Made, Aver Leaders, THE
HINDU (Jan. 22, 2011), http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/makarajyothi-is-man-
made-aver-leaders/article 1109340.ece.
64. Radhakrishnan Kuttoor, TDB Was Lighting the Fire: Ex-Commissioner, THE
HINDU (Jan. 23, 2011), http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/tdb-was-lighting-the-
fire-excommissioner/articlel116827.ece.
65. Makaravilakku Is a Star: Senior Thantri, THE HINDU (Jan. 24, 2011) (on file
with author).
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court was on summer holiday, the temple bench declared, "We need
only notice that the [TDBJ stands to affirm that what is seen as a
light is lit every year at [the empty field] as part of rituals . . . . No
further inquiry is called for regarding faith."6 6
That declaration was, to say the least, anti-climactic. The twenty-
odd people present in the courtroom clapped furiously when the court
finally adjourned, but by this time the proceedings had long since
turned to administrative concerns and the applause was only tangen-
tially connected to the star and the lamp. And yet, the temple bench's
inquiry-combined with its ruling-had effected something striking:
the court had engaged in the reformist task of exposing religious and
political machinations without, at least officially, making any "further
inquiry ... regarding faith." In other words, it had both done and not
done what it set out to do, which was to tell "the people" whether the
phenomena of Makarasankranti are divine. In the following section,
we'll see the temple bench carry off a similar balancing act when con-
fronted with the all-too-common problem of bureaucratic redundancy.
B. A New Board for Sabarimala?
After the temple bench turned its attention away from the star
and the lamp, it began to focus on problems in Sabarimala's adminis-
tration. Many of the issues it examined were minute-road and build-
ing maintenance, donation-counting procedures-but he court also
considered the overall bureaucratic infrastructure of the temple. This
wasn't the first time the bench had engaged in this kind of holistic
review: calls for revamping Sabarimala's governance, and even for
overhauling the entire temple board system, surface pretty regu-
larly.6 7 But the range of alternatives presented to the temple bench in
2011 was striking, as was the court's ultimate conclusion.
One option was to turn to the Indian Administrative Service (IAS).
The IAS has inherited a remarkable reputation for cohesiveness,
political neutrality, and high-quality personnel from its colonial precur-
sor (the Indian Civil Service), and so it's often considered something
of a bureaucratic Band-Aid.68 Moreover, Kerala had already experi-
mented with IAS involvement in temple governance: in 2009, the TDB
and CDB had been unseated over corruption worries and an IAS officer
was brought in to run the show until new boards could be appointed.
66. Kerala High Court, Cochin, Kerala (Apr. 26, 2011).
67. In 2007, the state government enacted the Devaswom Ordinance-which,
among other things, reduced the tenure of the temple boards to two years-in response
to widespread concern over corruption. By way of illustration, a former TDB attor-
ney estimated that (in 2011) the going rate for high-level positions in Sabarimala's
administrative hierarchy (not the TDB's) was between fifteen and twenty-five lakhs,
or around $33,000-$55,000 in then-current U.S. dollars. Interview with Vijayara-
ghavan, former TDB attorney, in Cochin, Kerala (Jan. 18, 2011).
68. See generally Arudra Burra, The Indian Civil Service and the Nationalist
Moment: Neutrality, Politics and Continuity, 48 COMMONWEALTH & COMP. POL. 404 (2010).
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The experiment worked so well that the Minister for Devaswom Affairs
suggested creating a permanent IAS position to oversee Sabarimala.69
The Minister for Cultural Affairs did him one better by suggesting that
the government install "a permanent organizational structure over and
above" the boards and staff it with the IAS.7 0
But despite this glowing track record, the temple bench
vacillated when the IAS was suggested in 2011. In its role as finan-
cial overseer for the boards, the bench created the position of "special
commissioner" and approved the appointment of an IAS officer to fill
the spot. The bench also decided that the same IAS officer would chair
the committee responsible for implementing a five-year "Sabarimala
master plan" that had been accepted back in 2007.71 At the same time,
though, the bench rejected all appeals to insert the IAS at the head of
either the TDB or Sabarimala's governance systems. The bench also
later shifted the IAS officer to the lesser position of "Sabarimala fes-
tival and chief government co-ordinator" (while retaining him on the
master plan committee) and appointed a non-IAS person to the posi-
tion of special commissioner.
A second option, and by far the most popular one, was to replicate
the governance structures of other prominent emples. The most pop-
ular candidate was the system used at Tirupati, in Andhra Pradesh,
which until 2012 was considered the richest temple in India.7 2 On
the first day of the stampede hearings, The Hindu was besieged by
letters to the editor strongly but vaguely extolling the virtues of the
"Tirupati model."7 3 Enthusiasm for the model wasn't limited to the
general public, either: Krishnakumar Mangot, the assistant to the
Devaswom ombudsman, argued that Sabarimala should institute a
69. Interestingly, the IAS officer was actually brought in by the state government
because a public interest litigation suit brought attention to corruption within the
TDB and pleaded for judicial oversight of the TDB's appointment process. Interview
with Vijayaraghavan, supra note 67.
70. Kerala Government Prepares Action Plan for Sabarimala, NDTV (Jan. 22,
2011), http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/kerala-government-prepares-action-plan-for-
sabarimala-445722.
71. The master plan was developed in conjunction with a private company,
Ecosmart, and would require the joint involvement of the TDB, the federal Ministry of
Environment and Forests, the Supreme Court, and the Government of Kerala.
72. See, e.g., Religious Giving: Do Unregulated 'Temples of God' Really Serve a
Higher Purpose?, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (May 19, 2011), http://knowledge.wharton.
upenn.edularticle/religious-giving-do-unregulated-temples-of-god-really-serve-a-
higher-purpose/ (describing Tirupati as "the richest religious establishment in India"
and saying that "only the Vatican is richer" than Tirupati's governing body, the TTD).
Tirupati was later overtaken by the Padmanabhaswamy temple in Kerala. See Das
Acevedo, supra note 35, at 856 n.39.
73. See, e.g., K. Deviprasad, Letter to the Editor, THE HINDU (Jan. 20, 2011) (on file
with author) ("The introduction of the Tirupati model will surely help change the situ-
ation."); K.K. Kunhikannan, Letter to the Editor, THE HINDU (Jan. 20, 2011) (on file
with author) ("The introduction of the Tirupati model to address the problem [of the
stampede] would efinitely help improve the situation."); Neelandon Kuruvattoor, Let-
ter to the Editor, THE HINDU (Jan. 20, 2011) (on file with author) ("The Tirupati model
is welcome in Sabarimala."); V.P. Ramesan, Letter to the Editor, THE HINDU (Jan. 20,
2011) (on file with author) ("The Tirupati model will definitely work at Sabarimala.").
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ticket system like Tirupati's in order to control the flow of pilgrims
into the temple complex during Makarasankranti. Likewise, Judge
Radhakrishnan requested information about Tirupati's employment
practices when considering the working conditions of Sabarimala's
donation counters.74
Tirupati's governing body, the Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanams
(TTD), was created in 1933 by the Madras Legislative Assembly to
govern Tirupati and a few surrounding shrines.7 5 The magic of the
Tirupati model seems to lie mostly in one feature: autonomy. Tiru-
pati's administrators may be more insulated from the political pro-
cess than the TDB because unlike the TDB, whose five-member
board can be filled by virtually anyone the state chooses to patron-
ize, Tirupati's fifteen-member board of trustees must include fixed
numbers of women and "scheduled caste" individuals as well as
at least three members of the state legislature. Conversely, only
Tirupati's executive officer and deputy executive officer are selected
by the state government.7 6 Finally, the TTD is "only" responsible for
Tirupati and its associated shrines-with "only" in quotation marks
because the TTD also operates a university, hospitals (including a
veterinary clinic), and a priest training center and administers all
utilities for the area under its control (which includes several vil-
lages). Nonetheless, this does mean that the TTD's income is wholly
its own (unlike Sabarimala) and that the interests of its constituent
parts are generally cohesive (unlike the TDB).
But despite Tirupati's phenomenal success and the High Court's
own episodic interest in pursuing the "Tirupati model," the court has
never seriously considered separating Sabarimala from the TDB and
granting it greater autonomy. We might interpret the court's resis-
tance as being historically motivated, since Sabarimala has been
under the authority of one state or another since at least 1820.77
Conversely, the court's resistance could represent a mercenary desire
to keep Sabarimala's considerable revenues within the state's con-
trol. But neither of these is especially compelling. The High Court
74. Kerala High Court, Cochin, Kerala (Apr. 25, 2011).
75. Background of TTD's Formation, TIRUMALA TIRUPATI BALAJI, http://www.
tirumalainfo.com/ttdAbout.html. See also Burton Stein, The Tirupati Temple: An
Economic Study of a Medieval South Indian Temple (1957) (unpublished Ph.D. dis-
sertation, University of Chicago) (available on ProQuest).
76. Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and
Endowments Act § 96 ("Constitution of Board of Trustees") (1987) (Andhra Pradesh).
77. The Pandalam family were minor chieftains and vassals to the rulers of Tra-
vancore. They maintain that Sabarimala's revenues were mortgaged to Travancore in
1794 to pay Pandalam's share of the defense against the Mysorean attack, and that
this arrangement was revised in 1820 to enable Travancore's direct administration of
Sabarimala and its related properties. Interview with Ramavarma Raja, head of the
Pandalam family, in Ernakulam, Kerala (July 25, 2011). Of course, to the extent that
the Pandalam family or its agents were themselves involved in the daily administra-
tion of Sabarimala (which is hard to determine at this point), Sabarimala has been
administered by a "state" for much, much longer.
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has been more than willing to innovate in the realm of temple gover-
nance, and-far from trying to hoard revenue for another branch of
government-it has repeatedly tried to mitigate the often extractive
qualities of state authority vis-a-vis temples (as with the star and the
lamp).78 Besides which, the desire to retain Sabarimala's revenues
within the larger TDB system isn't self-evidently mercenary. The vast
majority of temples would cease to exist without the redistributive
system operated by the boards. To the extent that we think these
dependent temples are worth maintaining, there's some reasonable
justification for appropriating and redistributing the income of rich
temples like Sabarimala.79
The final option for administrative overhaul that was proposed
in 2011 was also by far the most ambitious: replace the five temple
boards with a single "Unified Devaswom Board" (UDB) in the hopes
that centralization would produce greater efficiency. This wasn't the
first time a UDB had been suggested. In 1990, a court-appointed com-
mittee reported that "Im] any persons who wrote to us and had discus-
sions with us made the point that the unification of laws relating to
the three areas of the State was vital for improving the management,
upkeep and maintenance of devaswoms . . . ."so And a court-appointed
(or at least court-brokered) UDB would fit perfectly within the vision
of uniform, transparent, and judicially-enforced temple governance
that was actively pursued by Justice Paripoornan and others in the
1980s and 1990s, and that still remains powerful within the boards
and the High Court today.
Nevertheless, the High Court has never warmed to the idea of a
UDB. No doubt this is partly because getting rid of the boards is polit-
ically infeasible, but it's also because administrative uniformity-
despite its aura of efficiency-doesn't fit comfortably with the court's
understanding of temples as deeply local institutions. "The needs of
... temples definitely vary," Judge Radhakrishnan said during the
2011 hearings; "there cannot be one standard form." 1
By one means or another, the proposals for regulatory overhaul
sought to fix Sabarimala's administrative problems by consolidat-
ing power over the temple. The temple bench, however, rejected all
these overtures. Instead of appointing an IAS officer at the top of
Sabarimala's regulatory pyramid, the court appointed one somewhere
in the middle, then removed him and created another position for
him-all of which resulted in a net gain in personnel. It re-endorsed
78. For example, during the Sabarimala dministration hearings, the TDB
requested permission to build and lease shops along the forest trekking path. Judge
Radhakrishnan reacted strongly, shouting that the TDB was behaving "as if sannid-
hanam [the path] and [the river] Pampa are shopping centers instead of pilgrimage
points!" Kerala High Court, Apr. 26, 2011 (Cochin, Kerala).
79. Das Acevedo, supra note 5, at 160.
80. V. RAMACHANDRAN, REPORT ON TRAVANCORE AND COCHIN DEVASWOM BOARDS 68
(1990).
81. Kerala High Court, Cochin, Kerala (Apr. 6, 2011).
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the "master plan," which required cooperation between various fed-
eral and state agencies. And it rejected proposals like the UDB and
the Tirupati model that would have centralized authority, either over
Sabarimala alone or over all public temples in Kerala.
At the same time, we can hardly say that the court objects to
centralization because it dislikes heavy state oversight. In fact, the
last three decades have witnessed an intensification of state author-
ity over temples as well as a proliferation of administrative person-
nel. Since the 1980s alone, the court has assumed audit powers over
the TDB, formed another temple board (the Malabar Devaswom
Board), and created several new temple administration positions
(the ombudsman, Devaswom commissioner, Sabarimala special com-
missioner, and Sabarimala festival coordinator). More individuals
and entities than ever before share in the responsibility of governing
Sabarimala, and more aspects of the temple's existence are subject to
official governance.
Nor has the court always gained from the growth in state author-
ity; in many cases it has either ceded some of its recently acquired
authority to other actors or refused to acquire more authority over
temple administration in the face of overt requests to do so.8 2 "We
don't want the Sabarimala Sastha [Ayyappan] to be subservient to
the High Court," joked Judge Radhakrishnan.3 He may simply have
been lightening the mood in an otherwise tense courtroom (it was the
penultimate day of the special hearings) but Radhakrishnan's words
can just as easily, and truthfully, be taken at face value.
II. DYNAMIC EQUILIBRIUM
So what do we make of the High Court's behavior over the star
and the lamp, as well as its unwillingness to consolidate authority
over Sabarimala? Perhaps the court merely lost the courage of its
convictions in both instances and avoided the hard work of unmask-
ing or disassembling existing practices. Conversely, the court may
have just been seeking to disingenuously "hide" state authority over
Sabarimala by raising questions it had no intention of answering,
or rejecting some solutions but adopting others with similar conse-
quences. Or finally, maybe the court simply reasonably changed its
mind in response to information gained during the proceedings.
Each of these explanations is unsatisfactory in its own way. The
first ("cold feet") explains the court's behavior by characterizing it
as exceptional, but doesn't explain why an otherwise "activist" court
(functioning as part of an "activist" judiciary) should falter in two
markedly different contexts. Nor can it adequately account for the fact
that the Kerala High Court has behaved similarly in other instances
82. See infra Part I (discussing changes in the appointment process for the Devas-
wom commissioner).
83. Kerala High Court, Cochin, Kerala (Apr. 25, 2011).
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not limited to Sabarimala, or that other courts have behaved simi-
larly outside of Kerala.8 4
Conversely, the third explanation ("information gathering")
explains away recurring judicial approaches to the state governance
of religion as the ordinary result of courtroom processes. It inade-
quately accounts for the court's decision to launch a suo motu inquiry
in the first place, as well as the fact that the court often has consid-
erable prior knowledge regarding the issues it sets out to tackle. In
other words, the "information gathering" view myopically focuses on
what happened in the courtroom while leaving unanswered the ques-
tion of why it happened as it did.
The second explanation ("sneaky regulation") is the most prob-
lematic because it assumes that the High Court is a strikingly-and
consistently-self-aware Machiavellian actor. Even if we're willing to
assume the worst of judicial motives (and it's not clear we should),8 5
it strains common sense to believe that a two-judge bench with fairly
frequent turnover will consistently reflect disingenuous motives over
a period of more than thirty years.6
Instead, as I'll argue below, the temple bench's behavior is best
understood as reflecting a deep and reasonable commitment to con-
flicting constitutional impulses. Those impulses concern the locus of
democratic sovereignty, which is conventionally-albeit in India not
entirely-held to be the citizenry.
A. Divided and Undivided Sovereignty
The idea that democracy in India is premised on something other
than conventional notions of citizen-sovereignty raises the question,
just what are those conventional notions? Contract theories of the state
are in some sense like cosmological turtles-they can be traced as far
back as you like-but (speaking purely for the Western line of turtles)
whether we take the American, Austinian, Hobbesian, Rousseauian,
or Roman version, the fundamental idea is that sovereignty is like
an object whose ownership can't really be shared. What to do when,
as always, sovereigns need to delegate some of their authority to rule
effectively? And even more vexingly, what about sovereigns who are
84. Das Acevedo, supra note 35, at 858-59 (regarding the High Court's handling
of the Padmanabhaswamy treasure scandal); Fuller, supra note 9.
85. As we've already seen, the High Court views state authority over temples
with decidedly mixed feelings, so it's not clear that it would want to stealthily expand
that authority. The court is also wary of being used as a pawn by power-hungry tem-
ple administrators. For instance, the Cochin Devaswom Board once asked the court
to use its audit powers to grant blanket permission for a building project. Judge
Radhakrishnan declined and, in granting more limited permission to the CDB,
he noted wryly that if "the High Court said 'approved', then ... khana, pina, sona
[eating, drinking, sleeping] ... everything by way of repairs, by way of audit." Kerala
High Court, Cochin, Kerala (March 9, 2011).
86. Interview with K. Balakrishnan, supra note 57 (stating that benches at the
Kerala High Court are usually reassigned every twelve to fifteen months by the chief
justice).
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non-corporeal, as they always are when "the people" are said to be in
charge?7
Some responses have been to effectively deny the possibility of
sovereignty in such situations. Hobbes took this route when he said
that the social contract was constructed in one step that vested no
right of recall in the people, and that the sovereign's actions didn't
necessarily reflect the popular will." So did Rousseau, who solved
the problem of delegation by making the entire citizenry sover-
eign. Indeed, basic democratic theory also answers that sovereignty
remains indivisible, because it is vested wholly in citizens and merely
exercised on their behalf by the state.
The difference is that democratic politics allows for the possibility
of meaningful delegation by non-corporeal sovereigns.8 9 And although
this view has come under increasing critique precisely because of
the worry that delegates necessarily usurp the authority entrusted
to them,90 democratic politics is still built on the idea that "the peo-
ple" own sovereignty and the state conditionally exercises it on their
behalf. In other words, per the conventional vision, popular sover-
eignty is undivided (because it's wholly vested in citizens) and popu-
lar sovereignty "fails" when the peoples' representatives substitute
their own will for that of the sovereign.
But if this is the fiction at the heart of democratic politics, it's
only half the story in contemporary India. India's constitutional fram-
ers were peculiarly doubtful that the country's new sovereigns could
fully and responsibly exercise their authority. This was perhaps never
truer than in the case of religion, where the framers worried that dis-
criminatory and oppressive religious practices would limit the trans-
formative potential of independence.91
87. Daniel Lee, The Right of Sovereignty and the Exercise Thereof: Civil-Law
Origins of a Public Law Distinction, Presentation at the Law, Culture and Society
Workshop at the University of Chicago (Feb. 22, 2012).
88. See, e.g., Hannah Pitkin, Introduction to THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 1
(Hannah Fenichel Pitkin ed., 1967).
89. Thus, for instance, according to J.P. Canning, Baldus maintained that "[t]he
people is the source of its officers' power, and concedes to them just as much power,
and tenure of office as it wishes.... This is the conception of representation essential
to the theme of popular sovereignty." J.P. Canning, The Corporation in the Political
Thought of the Italian Jurists of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries, 1 HIST. POL.
THOUGHT 9, 29 (1980). Of course, theorists like Hannah Pitkin argue that grounding
successful representation in the right of recall overly emphasizes the formalistic ele-
ments of initiation and termination, and tells us nothing about "what is supposed to
go on during representation." HANNAH PITKIN, REPRESENTATION 9 (1969).
90. See, e.g., ROBERT C. GRADY, RESTORING REAL REPRESENTATION 5 (1993) (setting
forth prescriptions for "how citizen representation can be restored to its 'pivotal' role
in politics").
91. See P.N. Bhagwati, Religion and Secularism Under the Indian Constitution, in
RELIGION AND LAW IN INDEPENDENT INDIA 35, 43 (Robert D. Baird ed., 2d ed. 2005):
[India's constitutional framers] knew that, left to itself, religion could permit
orthodox men to burn widows alive on the piers [sic] of their deceased hus-
bands. It could encourage and in its own subtle ways, even coerce indulgence
in social evils like child marriage or even crimes like human sacrifice or it
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At the same time, the Constitution doesn't simply authorize the
state to regulate and reform religion for the purpose of preventing
third-party effects like discrimination and oppression. Third-party
effects are often absent, since the state seeks to support and celebrate
Hinduism as well as to limit the oppressive and discriminatory conse-
quences of some Hindu practices. More importantly, the Constitution
goes far beyond granting the state minimal discretionary authority
to realize specific goods set out in advance by the people being regu-
lated. It envisions a state with huge independent discretion to control
social ordering; for instance, it can regulate anything touching the
secular aspects of religion. Having that kind of discretion baked right
into one's constitutional cake means that sovereignty can't be wholly
owned by citizens: it has to be shared by both citizens and the state.92
Of course, any constitution that protects rights necessarily grants
the state authority to define and limit the scope of those rights. When
the ostensibly noninterventionist U.S. Constitution provides that the
state shall not create laws "respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,"9 3 it enables-and indeed
forces-the state to determine what counts as "religion."9 4 No mat-
ter how mild-mannered the constitutional prose, the effects it has
on religious practice are likely to be profound, as well as potentially
unpleasant.9 5
But the Indian Constitution is in a class, more or less, of its
own. 96 Indian courts intentionally and proudly act as religious
exegetes, whereas their American counterparts (for example) "have
always been shy about entering this arena."9 7 Indian judges are
required to do more of this exegesis because so many areas of Indian
law-family, trust, penal, and electoral law, to name a few-are
could consign women to the perpetual fate of devadasis or relegate large sec-
tions of humanity to the sub-human status of untouchability and inferiority.
It's perhaps worth noting that Bhagwati is one of the most well-known and most
"activist" former justices of the Indian Supreme Court.
92. I'm essentially characterizing India's approach to regulating religion as a kind
of "political paternalism." Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternal-
ism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1162 (2003) (defining "political pater-
nalism" as the idea that "it is legitimate for private and public institutions to attempt
to influence people's behavior even when third-party effects are absent").
93. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cls. 1-2.
94. See generally WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS FREE-
DOM (2005).
95. Id. at 5, 7 (observing that "legally defined orthodoxy, not sincerity, was the
final standard" used in a case about religious symbols in a Florida cemetery and ask-
ing whether the plaintiffs had consented to "ill-informed and sometimes humiliating
badgering about their religious beliefs and practices").
96. See, e.g., Ran Hirschl, Comparative Constitutional Law and Religion, in Com-
PARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 422 (Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon eds., 2011) (iden-
tifying eight constitutional approaches to religion ranging from the most to the least
separation between religion and state, and placing India in the seventh category, just
shy of "strong establishment" countries like Iran, Egypt, and Pakistan).
97. SULLIVAN, supra note 94, at 100.
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either explicitly based on religious identity or take religious iden-
tity into serious consideration.98 Yet, unlike courts in avowedly or
essentially theocratic states, Indian courts do all of this as the judi-
cial wing of a secular democratic state. And since 1971, they have
done so with almost total immunity as a result of the substantive
limits on constitutional amendment created by the "basic structure
doctrine"-limits that are applicable to "all forms of state action,"99
including "ordinary legislation and executive action."10 0 Because "no
basic feature of the constitution is embodied in a single article of the
constitution,"101 even constitutional amendments cannot alter the
state's role in regulating religion if, as is highly plausible, that role is
deemed to be a "basic feature."
Put differently, in interrogating the ontological nature of the star
and the lamp, and in increasing the number and kinds of officials over-
seeing Sabarimala, the Kerala High Court's temple bench suggested
that the state can legitimately participate in ordering the sphere of
religious activity. At the same time, in refusing to make an official dec-
laration about the star and the lamp and in refusing to fully empower
official authority over Sabarimala, the bench affirmed that religious
activity should be protected from state involvement. The bench's seem-
ingly inconsistent actions reflect two different (and constitutionally
supported) ideas about who should possess overeign authority in
India: citizens only, or both citizens and the state. By adopting a "both-
and" approach rather than fully expanding or retracting state author-
ity over religion, the court stayed true to both visions and maintained
the dynamic equilibrium between them that is at the heart of Indian
democracy.1 02
B. Dynamic Equilibrium
"Dynamic equilibrium" describes more than India's approach to reli-
gion-state relations, but it's perhaps easiest to see in the relationship
between government and organized religion (especially Hinduism).103
98. Marc Galanter, Hinduism, Secularism, and the Indian Judiciary, 21 PHIL.
E. & W 467, 468-69 (1971).
99. SUDHIR KRISHNASWAMY, DEMOCRACY AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN INDIA: A STUDY OF THE
BASIC STRUCTURE DOCTRINE, at xxix (2009). It's worth noting that there is no widely
accepted list of "basic features."
100. Id. at xxi.
101. Id. at 87.
102. Others have described India using terminology that's similar to "dual
sovereignty," but to different effect. For example, Krishnaswamy says that "the only
satisfactory account of sovereignty in the Indian Constitution must embrace an
institutionally dispersed concept of sovereignty which is both legal and political in
character and is composed of multiple and unranked sources of sovereign power."
KRISHNASWAMY, supra note 99, at 211. However, Krishnaswamy's assertion comes at
the end of his in-depth analysis of the basic structure doctrine and is left somewhat
tantalizingly unexplored.
103. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Striking a Uniquely Indian Balance: Innovations in
Indian Intellectual Property Law, Presentation at the University of Chicago Sympo-
sium: India in the Global Legal Context: Courts, Culture, and Commerce (Apr. 4, 2014).
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For one, we have considerable knowledge regarding the perpetually
vexing issue of framers' intent: religion-state relations were an excep-
tionally well-discussed feature of the Constituent Assembly debates,
and those debates have themselves been excellently documented and
discussed.104 More importantly, India experienced relative continuity
between the people who passed the Constitution and those who-judi-
cially and legislatively-first acted upon its approach to religion, par-
ticularly Hinduism.1 0 5
The first two decades of independent India (which roughly coin-
cided with Nehru's prime ministership) saw a great deal of activity
as the state sought to live up to the reformist principles of a new
Constitution that prohibited untouchability and opened up the secu-
lar aspects of religion to state oversight.106 For instance, in 1955-1956,
Parliament passed four pieces of legislation that reconstructed and
reformed Hindu personal law, adding modernizations like divorce and
removing outdated practices like polygamy.10 7 In 1958 and '59, the
Supreme Court decided important cases regarding access to Hindu
temples and what counted as a temple for the purposes of Article 17's
prohibition of untouchability.10s
Yet in the midst of this project to reform Hinduism, the state-
whether federal or provincial, legislative or judicial-hasn't gone all
the way. Instead, it has (occasionally) held itself back. Restraint has
often been a political necessity, as when Nehru compromised with reli-
gious communities by relegating the call for a Uniform Civil Code to
the non-justiciable Directive Principles section of the Constitution. 109
Likewise, politically motivated restraint characterized the govern-
mental response to the high-profile Shah Bano case of 1985, when
104. See generally Constituent Assembly Debates (Proceedings), PARLIAMENT OF
INDIA-LOK SABHA-HOUSE OF THE PEOPLE, http://1oksabha.nic.in/ (choose "Debates,"
then "Constituent Assembly Debates," then the dates or keywords of choice); see also
Mahajan, supra note 9.
105. The Hindu Code bills were passed by independent India's first elected Parlia-
ment, which succeeded the Constituent Assembly as India's governing body and sat
from 1952-1957. While it's a doubtful proxy for continuity, it may be worth noting
that 208 of the 389 seats in the Constituent Assembly and 364 of the 489 seats in the
first Parliament were held by Nehru's Indian National Congress. See General (1st
Lok Sabha) Election Results India: India General Election Results-1951, ELECTIONS.
IN, http://www.elections.in/parliamentary-constituencies/1951-election-results.html.
106. INDIA CONST. arts. 17, 25(2)(b).
107. The Hindu Code bills include the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, No. 25, Acts of
Parliament, 1955; the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, No. 30, Acts of Parliament, 1956;
the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, No. 32, Acts of Parliament, 1956;
and the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, No. 78, Acts of Parliament,
1956. For an impassioned pre-passage d fense of the bills, see Renuka Ray, The Back-
ground of the Hindu Code Bill, 25 PAC. AFF. 268, 277 (1952) (stating that "[i]n many
quarters [the bills'] fortunes are regarded as a measure of the strength of the ele-
ments of progress and reaction").
108. INDIA CONST. art. 17; Sastri Yagnapurushdasji v. Muldas Bhundardas Vaisya,
AIR 1966 SC 1119; Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore, AIR 1958 SC 255.
109. Deepa Das Acevedo, Developments in Hindu Law from the Colonial to the Pre-
sent, 7 REL. COMPASS 252, 258-59 (2013).
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Rajiv Gandhi's administration reversed course on expanding the
rights of Muslim women upon divorce.1 0
But not all of this restraint is politically motivated: some of it is
mandated by the Constitution itself. In keeping with the idea that
religion is a sphere of personal activity (although, of course, in India it
is also a sphere of group activity), the Supreme Court declared that the
essential, and thus constitutionally protected, elements of a religion
must be determined with respect to the religion itself.' The "essential
practices" doctrine has sometimes afforded religious communities a
little elbow room-for instance, the TDB has successfully mounted an
essential-practices defense in suits targeting Sabarimala's exclusion
of physically mature women.1 12 Admittedly, the doctrine has just as
often allowed the Court to define the essence of religion in ways that
make it conform to reformist principles. In Seshammal, for instance,
the Supreme Court held that temple priests needn't be hereditary
appointees (and thus exclusively Brahmin), adding that the plaintiffs'
assertion to the contrary was based on faulty exegesis.1 13 This process
of interpreting away conflict likely seems suspicious-if not for the
sheer shock value of Supreme Court justices parsing Sanskrit texts,
then because it just seems too sneakily convenient.
But we shouldn't be totally cynical about this kind of reform-by-exe-
gesis. For one thing, as a means of changing social norms it's just as avail-
able to citizens as to the state: the plaintiffs in the Sabarimala women's
entry suit drew on customary and eyewitness accounts to show that,
properly understood, temple ritual had never required a ban on women.
Just as importantly, reform-by-exegesis is a perfectly acceptable religious
practice: "religious texts are continually reinterpreted by reformists in
accordance with the perennial goal of 'recovering' the original truths lost
by subsequent misinterpretations."114 We might not go so far as to say that
Indian courts and parliaments should engage in reformist exegesis, but
we should resist characterizing their efforts as uniquely disingenuous.11 5
110. Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, (1985) 3 SCR 844 (concerning a
sixty-two-year-old Muslim woman's suit for alimony). Under pressure from conserva-
tive Islamic leaders, Parliament reversed the Supreme Court judgment in her favor and
passed the rather ironically named Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce)
Act, 1986, No. 25, Acts of Parliament, 1986, which sought to completely eliminate
divorc6es' right to alimony. Interestingly, however, some commentators argue that the
statute's wording combined with liberal judicial interpretation have resulted in a net
improvement for Muslim women. See, e.g., Flavia Agnes, Economic Rights of Women in
Islamic Law, 31 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 2832, 2836-37 (1996)
111. Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra
Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, AIR 1954 SC 282. It should be noted that the
case largely upheld the temple entry statute challenged by the plaintiffs.
112. S. Mahendran v. The Secretary, Travancore Devaswom Board, OP No.
9015/1990-S.
113. Seshammal v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1973) 3 SCR 815.
114. Fuller, supra note 9, at 234.
115. Contra Mehta, supra note 12 (arguing that the Indian Parliament is effec-
tively a Hindu parliament because of the numerical majority of Hindu members, and
that in the absence of a Hindu ecclesiastical hierarchy it's appropriate for Parliament
to create laws governing the Hindu community).
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C. On the Combinations and Permutations of Liberal Democracy
My claim that Indian judges restrain themselves even as they
engage with religion to a striking degree isn't mine alone.116 Neither
is my suggestion that the dual goals of restraint and reform exist in
tension with one another.11 7 But what previous commentators have
overlooked is the possibility that this tension is an intentional and
productive feature of Indian constitutionalism writ large (and by
extension, of Indian democracy) rather than being accidental, patho-
logical, or specifically about religion.18
Why should we view this dynamic as intentional? Because, as the
beginning of Part II.B pointed out, we know a great deal about the
process of constitutional drafting in India and what the various arti-
cles of the Constitution were intended to achieve. Because the people
who drafted the Constitution were largely also the people who wrote
early statutes, like the Hindu Code bills, which further defined reli-
gion-state relations.119 And because the federal judiciary has repeat-
edly worked to restrain itself and other state branches even as it has
tried to reform religious institutions and practices.
It's also more productive to maintain an equilibrium between
reform and restraint (and the visions of divided and undivided sov-
ereignty they correspond to) than to seek resolution in either direc-
tion. The state in India was always meant to do more than preserve
and protect-when Nehru opened the Constituent Assembly, he did
so by instructing it to "free India through a new constitution[,] to
feed the starving people, and to cloth[e] the naked masses[,] and to
give every Indian the fullest opportunity to develop himself accord-
ing to his capacity."120 Conceptualizing sovereignty as being divided
between the people and the state enables the state to undertake the
kind of broad and often unpredictable reforms required to construct
116. See Bhagwati, supra note 91; Rajeev Bhargava, Democratic Vision of a New
Republic: India, 1950, in TRANSFORMING INDIA: SOCIAL AND POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF DEMOC-
RACY 26 (Francine R. Frankel et al. eds., 2002); Fuller, supra note 9.
117. See JACOBSOHN, supra note 11.
118. Other descriptions of this tension-many of them by supporters of India's
approach to religion-state relations-have used words like "wrestling" (Bhargava,
supra note 116, at 39), "stranglehold" (ROCHANA BAJPAI, DEBATING DIFFERENCE: GROUP
RIGHTS AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY IN INDIA 46 (2011)), or "contradiction" (LLOYD I. RUDOLPH &
SUSANNE HOEBER RUDOLPH, IN PURSUIT OF LAKSHMI: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE INDIAN
STATE 38 (1987)). Even those who have emphasized the positive potential of this
dynamic have conceived of the tension between reform and restraint as specific to
religion and secular governance. See, e.g., terms such as "principled eclecticism" (MARC
GALANTER, COMPETING EQUALITIES: LAW AND THE BACKWARD CLASSES IN INDIA (1984)); "princi-
pled distance" (Bhargava, supra note 16), and "celebratory neutrality" (Dhavan, supra
note 16) that gesture toward the tension but are limited to describing religion-state
relations in India.
119. See General (1st Lok Sabha) Election Results India: India General Election
Results-1951, supra note 105.
120. CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY OF INDIA: DEBATES, vol. 2 (Jan. 22, 1947), http://par-
liamentofindia.nic.in/s/debates/vol2p3.htm (statement of Hon. Pandit Jawaharlal
Nehru) (official translation from Hindustani).
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a more equitable society. It also acknowledges ome longstanding and
valuable relationships between the state and society, as we saw with
the colonial and precolonial regulation of Hindu institutions in Part
I. At the same time, restraining the state by demarcating some things
(like ontological truths) as being beyond its purview gives meaning to
the fundamental break from colonial governance and signals popular
appropriation of political power. A state that reaches too far into
citizens' lives ceases to represent and starts to merely rule.
All of this is to say that the dominance of either view would pre-
clude ends that have been deemed essential to good governance in
modern India. The goods of liberal democratic politics-particularly
the supremacy of the individual over the group, and of the people
over their government-are not the goods of Indian politics in their
entirety. There are also other goods-which we might call communal
(as Hindu nationalists often do)121 or ameliorative or confrontational
(as Gary Jacobsohn sometimes does)12 2-that, regardless of the name
we use, point to the idea that groups sometimes trump individuals,
and that government can reshape society in ways that society could
not possibly have requested.12 3 That neither vision of sovereignty
dominates the courts indicates health rather than sickness, and par-
ticular moments of instability are caused by the prioritization (by
citizens and by courts) of one view over the other within a specific
context.
This doesn't mean that liberal democratic government takes a
fundamentally different form in India. That line of thinking is one I'm
generally suspicious of, as well as one that I've already criticized in
the specific case of "Indian secularism."124 When I say that one element
of India's dynamic equilibrium is a classically "liberal" vision of demo-
cratic sovereignty, I mean just that: liberal democracy has, in India,
been partnered with a contrasting theory of the good life and the
means of achieving it. In this sense, I agree with Tribe that it is "pro-
foundly anti-constitutional to read substantive, enlightenment-based
121. "Communal" and "communalism" have a complicated history in India,
but they generally refer to a politics based on religious identity. See, e.g., VINAYAK
DAMODAR SAVARKAR, HINDUTVA: WHO IS A HINDU? 125-26 (5th ed. 1969) (discussing the
appropriateness of "special and communal representation" for Muslims, Sikhs, and
other religious communities, and arguing that such representation would be accept-
able for Sikhs if they agreed to be classified "as Sikhs religiously, but as Hindus
racially and culturally").
122. See, e.g., GARY JEFFREY JACOBSOHN, THE WHEEL OF LAW: INDIA'S SECULARISM IN
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 15 (2003) (discussing restrictions on religious
speech in the context of "the ameliorative commitments of the Indian Constitution");
Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn, Revolution or Evolution: The Challenges of Constitutional
Design, 48 TULSA L. REV. 235, 242 (2012) (reviewing HANA LERNER, MAKING CONSTITU-
TIONS IN DEEPLY DIVIDED SOCIETIES (2011)) ("The intentions behind the [Indian] constitu-
tion were confrontational.").
123. GURPREET MAHAJAN, IDENTITIES AND RIGHTS: ASPECTS OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY IN INDIA
4 (1998) (arguing that "the Indian Constitution deviated from the liberal framework"
in its valuation of group life).
124. Das Acevedo, supra note 5.
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ideals" completely out of a document that includes them, simply
because the same document contains other ideals that we've chosen
to emphasize in our descriptions of the document.12 5
Finally, this also doesn't mean that "dynamic equilibrium" is itself
a constitutional identity of the type that Jacobsohn identifies and
Tribe rejects. After all, there is no substance to the equilibrium itself.
And although I suppose we could say that this kind of instability is
itself a "constitutional identity," I'm not sure we gain anything by
doing so. The real value in thinking about dynamic equilibrium and
the absence of defined constitutional identity in India is that it sug-
gests liberal democracy can be based on something more than a
theory of citizen-sovereignty. If my characterization of sovereignty in
India is correct-and, of course, if we can agree that India is a liberal
democracy-then we need to think seriously about what exactly char-
acterizes liberal democratic governance.
CONCLUSION
As promised, this Article started out with a few anecdotes about
temples in a small southwestern Indian state and ended up with
broad claims about the theoretical underpinnings of democratic
governance anywhere in the world. Along the way, I suggested that
democracy in India envisions two very different forms of sovereignty:
one where sovereignty vests wholly in citizens, and another where
citizens share their status as sovereigns with the state. And, conve-
niently, I left the full consequences of this argument for democratic
theory lying around to be picked up another day, in another paper.
But there was one more thing this Article set out to do, and that
was to show that anthropology has distinct contributions to offer legal
scholarship-even in the august and theoretically weighty realm of
constitutional law. If we had simply read the orders and decisions
produced by the Kerala High Court in 2011, we might have come
away with a vision of Indian law and politics that saw them as com-
mitted to some (comparatively weak) form of governmental restraint.
This would have been wrong. If we had simply read previous deci-
sions by the temple bench and other federal courts, we might have
decided that Indian courts observe almost no restraint during their
forays into religion, or that they're just very confused. This too would
have been wrong. What observations, conversations, and a commit-
ment to ethnography contributed toward this journey was a narrative
with which to connect seemingly conflicting pieces of information.
And that is powerfully valuable across disciplines.
125. Tribe, supra note 22, at 172. See also BAJPAI, supra note 118, at 24 (arguing
that the Constituent Assembly and thus the Constitution moved significantly away
from the primacy of communities and towards a politics based on the individual, such
that "Indian nationalism spoke out in a common, liberal voice against group-differen-
tiated rights in this period").
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